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HARRY P. CARROLL, ESQ.t 
"{PJoverty is the parent of revolution and crime."l 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. New London2 
aroused a great deal of public controversy.3 For the most part, 
alarm over the Kelo case is rooted in misinformation about the facts 
and a misunderstanding of the law. The Kelo case illustrates how a 
public-private partnership can successfully change poverty-produc­
ing conditions into prosperity-promoting conditions. The United 
States Constitution does not prevent the government from using its 
sovereign power to create conditions that help the American peo­
ple prosper. To contend otherwise is to ignore common sense and 
the history of civilization, to say nothing of constitutional law. Re­
ducing poverty among the people of the United States "insure[s] 
domestic Tranquility, ... promote[s] the general Welfare, and se­
* This essay was prepared for the Issues in Community Economic Development 
symposium held at Western New England College School of Law on March 24, 2006. 
t Attorney Carroll is a member of the Massachusetts Bar. His extensive legal 
experience includes work on all aspects of eminent domain acquisition, serving as lead 
trial counsel in state eminent domain jury trials, and providing legal advice to decision 
makers in connection with eminent domain and other development projects. He is an 
occasional speaker on legal topics at professional events. 
1. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 2.6.1265b12, in 2 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 445, 461 
(W.D. Ross ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 2d ed., Univ. Chicago Press 1990), reprinted in 
8 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (Mortimer J. Adler, ed. 1996). 
2. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo Ill), 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
3. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, The "Backlash" So Far: Will Citizens Get Meaning­
ful Eminent Domain Reform?, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: EMINENT DOMAIN 
AND LAND VALUATION LITIGATION 703, 703 (2006), available at http://d2d.ali-aba.org/_ 
files/thumbs/course_materials/cl049-ch28_thumb.pdf ("[T)he eminent domain case of 
Kelo v. New London was greeted with anger and frustration in the popular media and 
in the halls of Congress. Editorials and magazine articles expressed popular outrage at 
the idea that a person's property can be condemned and transferred to another private 
party for development and private profit. The House of Representatives passed a reso­
lution, by a vote of 365 to 33, expressing 'the grave disapproval of the House of Repre­
sentatives regarding the majority opinion of the Supreme Court.'" (citations omitted) 
(quoting H.R. Res. 340, 109th Congo (2005))). 
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cure[s] the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."4 
Although the above appears self-explanatory, the misinformation 
generated about Kelo has created considerable public consterna­
tion; therefore, it seems appropriate, if not essential, to attempt to 
set the record straight. Reviewing Kelo in its true context demon­
strates that real economic development is a proper public use of the 
eminent domain power. That context, a topic worthy of study in its 
own right, clarifies the contours of the key Keto problem, helps 
identify the only viable way to solve it, and reveals why eminent 
domain was exercised to effectuate the solution. 
I. THE FACTS 
A. The Growth and Decline of New London 
New London, Connecticut, is situated near the mouth of the 
Thames River on Long Island Sound. It was founded in 1646 by 
Puritan John Winthrop of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.5 When 
he was a twenty-four year old colonel in the Virginia militia, 
George Washington slept there.6 During the Revolutionary War, 
New London was partially burned by British forces under the com­
mand of Benedict Arnold.7 It was blockaded by the British in the 
War of 1812.8 New London "reached the height of its maritime 
prosperity in the [nineteenth century] when it flourished as a ship­
ping, shipbuilding, and whaling port."9 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, New London en­
tered a slow spiral of deterioration. After "[d]ecades of economic 
4. U.S. CaNsT. pmbl. 
5. "New London ... is home to the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Connecticut 
College, and Mitchell College. Famous New Londoners include Revolutionary War 
hero Nathan Hale and playwright Eugene O'Neil!." New London Public Library, http:/ 
/www.lioninc.org/newlondon (last visited Dec. 26, 2006); see also The New London Ga­
zette, A Winter Visitor, http://www.newlondongazette.comJgeorgew.html (last visited 
Dec. 26, 2006) [hereinafter "A Winter Visitor"] (describing George Washington's visit 
to New London as a twenty-four year old colonel in the Virginia militia). 
6. A Winter Visitor, supra note 5. 
7. See Albert E. Van Dusen, British Raid on New London and Groton, http:// 
www.ctheritage.org/encyclopedialct1763_1818Ibritish_nl....groton.htm (last visited Dec. 
26,2006) (describing Arnold's raid on New London and Groton as "[t]he final British 
attack on Connecticut" of the Revolutionary War and stating that it "was the most 
perfidious and brutal of the war"). 
8. BENSON J. LOSSING, PICTORAL FIELD BOOK OF THE WAR OF 1812, at 888 
(1869), available at http://freepages.history.rootsweb.comJ-wcarrl/Lossing2/Chap38 
.htm!. 
9. New London Public Library, http://www.lioninc.org/newlondon (visited on 
Dec. 26, 2006; on file with Western New England Law Review). 
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decline,"10 this once flourishing historic community withered away 
as its economy slowly died. By 1990, worsening economic condi­
tions in New London led to the city's classification as a "distressed 
municipality"l1 under Connecticut's State Commerce Act.12 That 
classification meant, among other things, that New London had fi­
nally sunk to the "quantitative physical and economic distress 
thresholds"13 required for eligibility in a federal grant program gen­
erally called UDAG.14 Thereafter, conditions in New London got 
worse. In 1996, New London sustained "serious employment de­
clines ... with the loss of approximately 1900 government sector 
positions, and the closure of the United States Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center ... , which transferred more than 1000 positions to 
Newport, Rhode Island."15 
By 1998, New London had hit bottom. Its "unemployment 
rate was nearly double that of the State, and its population of just 
under 24,000 residents was at its lowest since 1920."16 The Fort 
Trumbull area of New London was hit especially hard. Historically, 
this ninety-acre peninsula, zoned for commercial and industrial 
use,17 had been an important part of the New London economy. 
As the Fort Trumbull economy slowly died, New London's eco­
nomic distress grew worse. When the city's condition deteriorated 
to the point where public action had to be taken, the obvious place 
to start was the Fort Trumbull peninsula. Unless this key economic 
engine could be restarted, the once proud, but now impoverished 
10. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo Ill), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005). 
11. The Connecticut Supreme Court refers to New London as a "distressed city." 
Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo /I), 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004), affd, 125 S. Ct. 
2655 (2005). Connecticut defines "distressed municipalities," CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32­
9p(b) (2000), but it does so in a manner that is interchangeable with the "distressed 
city" phrase in Kelo. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-9p(g) (2000) (stating, '''[m]unicipality' 
means any town, city or borough in the state"). 
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-1a (2005). 
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-9p(b). 
14. The Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) is a federal program admin­
istered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The 
UDAG program was authorized under the Housing and Community Development Act 
of 1977. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, ch. 119, 91 Stat. 1125 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (2000)); see also 24 C.F.R. § 570.450-66 (1996) 
(regulating the UDAG program). 
15. Kelo II, 843 A.2d at 510. 
16. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo lI/), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005). 
17. Defendants' Exh. 34, Draft Envtl. Impact Evaluation: Fort Trumbull MDP 
Area (1998), Kelo Ill, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (No. 04-108), available at 2004 WL 2921787, at 
*239, *288 [hereinafter Fort Trumbull MDP Area]. 
78 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:75 
and polluted, historic community of New London would continue 
to crumble. 
B. Reviving New London 
1. The Hidden Opportunity 
When the Fort Trumbull area was prosperous, New London's 
economy remained strong. As the private sector shut down and left 
the Fort Trumbull area, the large number of government jobs lo­
cated there continued to provide some financial stability. However, 
when the government jobs were downsized, outsourced, or relo­
cated, the local economy began to collapse.18 Private charity and 
public welfare cannot end poverty or bring about prosperity: "All 
the soup kitchens and homeless shelters in the world cannot substi­
tute for community and economic development which provide jobs 
with decent wages, and dignity."19 To stop its slide into ruin, New 
London needed to lure the private sector back to the Fort Trumbull 
area. 
If a large, prosperous company could be persuaded to build a 
major facility in the area and create hundreds of new jobs, it might 
be sufficient to halt the economic decline. The task was formidable 
for many reasons. At anyone time, few companies have both the 
need for a new facility of the necessary magnitude and the financial 
capacity to build it. The competition for the few such companies in 
the market is global in scope. Therefore, to compete, New London 
needed a site with sufficiently attractive features. 
New London had the New London Mills site. This site had 
nearly all the attributes needed to be competitive: it was vacant, it 
was cleared, and it was ready for immediate development. Even 
with that site, however, New London's ability to attract the needed 
new employer was far from a sure thing-the New London Mills 
site was polluted. Any company that can invest hundreds of mil­
lions of dollars and create thousands of new jobs paying good wages 
has many options when it comes to constructing a major new facil­
ity. Businesses are understandably reluctant to make the significant 
capital investment necessary to buy, build, and conduct business on 
18. See, e.g., Keto II, 843 A.2d at 542. 
19. Marian Wright Edelman, Founder, Children's Def. Fund, Standing Up For 
the World's Children: Leave No Child Behind, Address Before the State of the World 
Forum (cir. 1996) (transcript available at Gifts of Speech, http://gos.sbc.edu/e/edelman 
.hlml). 
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a polluted site.20 Although the New London Mills site was bur­
dened with this problem, the burden was not insurmountable. The 
site's advantages made it quite attractive notwithstanding the pollu­
tion problem. Standing alone, the New London Mills site was a very 
tempting investment opportunity; but the site did not stand alone. 
The New London Mills site was adjacent to the Fort Trumbull 
peninsula; and that was the problem. The Fort Trumbull peninsula 
housed the regional wastewater treatment facility, which emitted 
foul odors21 and was part of the disintegrating Fort Trumbull penin­
sula. Both the New London Mills site and the Fort Trumbull penin­
sula were serviced by a decrepit infrastructure. The deplorable 
conditions on the Fort Trumbull peninsula were deal-killers for the 
type of major new private investment at the New London Mills site 
necessary to halt New London's economic decline. No investor 
would risk the private capital needed to make the New London 
Mills site functional if the conditions on the adjacent Fort Trumbull 
peninsula continued to deteriorate. In the past, the New London 
economy prospered along with the Fort Trumbull peninsula. To 
find the way out of poverty and back to prosperity, New London 
needed to go back to its past and find a way back to the future: 
"The past causes the present, and so the future."22 
2. Halting the Decline 
Solving the problems on the Fort Trumbull peninsula, those in­
hibiting successful marketing of the adjacent New London Mills site 
and those making the whole peninsula economically obsolete, 
would stop the economic decline and restore prosperity to New 
London. The problems were related; therefore, a comprehensive 
solution was needed. A patchwork approach would, at best, halt 
the decline. An integrated solution for both problems was required 
20. It is '''unusual' for a major employer to move 'into an urban area, especially 
into a brown site ... that has environmental problems. They tend to go to suburban 
areas, tend to go to green fields.'" Kelo II, 843 A.2d at 538 (quoting testimony from the 
trial record). 
21. Peter L. Costas, Dispelling the Myths About the Fort Trumbull Project, NEW 
LONDON DAY, Nov. 6,2005, at C4; see also Warren Richey, A Fight to Keep Their 
Homes, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 16, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor 
.com/2005/0216/plls01-lihc.html (noting that "on hot summer days with no breeze, the 
stench [from the wastewater treatment plant] blanketed the area"); Fort Trumbull MDP 
Area, supra note 17, at *243-44 (stating that the development plan included an upgrade 
to the current wastewater and sewage treatment facilities "to reduce odors, improve 
aesthetics, and improve the quality of treated wastewater"). 
22. Peter N. Stearns, Why Study History?, AM. HIST. ASS'N (1998), available at 
http://www.historians.orglpubs/free/whystudyhistory.htm. 
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to restore prosperity. Furthermore, neither the public nor the pri­
vate sector acting alone could solve the problem. The solution re­
quired an informal yet effective public-private partnership to be 
created, working out the problems inherent in such a significant 
undertaking. 
The solution involved two separate projects. The first project 
was primarily a private economic-development project-to produce 
new jobs and invest private capital for business purposes. This pri­
vate project would put enough money in the local economy to halt 
New London's continuing economic decline. The second project 
was primarily a public economic-development project-to restart 
the economic engine on the Fort Trumbull peninsula so it would 
again become a mainstay of the New London economy. These two 
projects would together restore prosperity on a long-term basis to 
New London. 
The private project materialized when Pfizer, Inc., a major in­
ternational pharmaceutical company, announced its intention to 
build its global research and development facility at the New 
London Mills site.23 William Longa, Pfizer's senior corporate coun­
sel, testified that Pfizer was willing to locate its facility on the New 
London Mills site, but only upon several conditions: an upgrade to 
the wastewater treatment facility, a restoration of the Fort Trumbull 
state park, and leveraging Pfizer's "significant local investment ... 
into a benefit for the entire city."24 
Pfizer's conditions would be difficult, but not impossible, to 
satisfy. The strategy for doing so became the public project. It had 
two major components. Some of the revitalization tasks needed in 
the Fort Trumbull area were in the area of governmental responsi­
bilities. The publicly owned regional sewage treatment facility 
needed upgrading to rid the Fort Trumbull area of nuisance odors.25 
The public infrastructure of the Fort Trumbull area needed modern­
ization. Old Fort Trumbull had a heroic past,26 and although it was 
no longer a significant contributor to our national defense, its rich 
23. Lynne Tuohy, High Court to Test Seizure of Homes, HARTFORD COURANT, 
Feb. 20, 2005, at AI. 
24. Kelo v. City of New London (Keto ll), 843 A.2d 500, 538 (Conn. 2004), affd, 
125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
25. See supra note 21. 
26. Fort Trumbull, because of its location, played a part in the Revolutionary 
War. In fact, the British captured the fort during the war and its courageous defenders 
were killed. See, e.g., John Duchesneau, The History of Fort Trumbull, http://www. 
geocities.com/-jmgould/trumhist.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2006). 
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local history and beautiful geographical location made it a perfect 
place to site a new public park. 
However, performing the traditional governmental remedies of 
cleaning up the site and improving the infrastructure would not re­
store prosperity to the Fort Trumbull area. After all, few, if any, 
new jobs would be created in performing those vital functions. For 
prosperity to return to New London, the remaining two-thirds of 
the Fort Trumbull peninsula had to be revitalized, not merely re­
paired. That was the second component of the public project. 
To maximize the potential for a successful revitalization effort, 
it was critical that a comprehensive plan be developed for the entire 
Fort Trumbull peninsula. To accomplish that complex task, one en­
tity needed to acquire all the separate, privately owned parcels in 
the area, as well as the former Naval Undersea Warfare Center 
(NUWC) site, so that the land could be redeveloped in a way that 
would complement and enhance the other public investments in the 
new state park and other facilities.27 The State of Connecticut real­
ized this and in early 1998 took steps to create a state park at Fort 
Trumbull,28 
27. Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo and the Local Political Process, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
13, 18 (2005). A comprehensive development plan 
entails a process that involves significant engagement by multiple actors in 
public hearings concerning what should be constructed where and by whom. 
One would anticipate that any such process will attract competing views-not 
only between property owners and developers, but also among developers, 
contractors, and planners .... 
. . . [T]he presence of a plan implies that multiple current landowners are 
at risk. Comprehensiveness and planning entail simultaneous consideration of 
multiple parcels. The importance of that characteristic is derived from the 
political concerns about eminent domain ... If eminent domain creates a risk 
of ganging up on a discrete minority of landowners who, by virtue of their 
small numbers, have little political power, then those concerns should diminish 
as the number of landowners increases. There is little need for the affected 
landowners to reach anything close to a majority to have effective political 
voice.... [T]hose directly affected, those whose personal landholdings are at 
risk, have sufficient incentive to become involved that even moderate numbers 
of them can swamp the political process by which a final determination is 
made . 
. . . [These practical implications of a development plan] ensure both a 
forum in which opposition to a proposed condemnation can be articulated­
the hearings process that is implicated in the promulgation of a comprehensive 
plan-and an environment in which those who do oppose the plan have suffi­
cient political weight that their voices can effectively be heard. 
Jd. 
28. Kelo II, 843 A.2d at 508. In addition, in "January, 1998, the state bond com­
mission authorized bonds to support planning activities in the Fort Trumbull area ... 
and property acquisition to be undertaken ... in support of the project and other 
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C. Eminent Domain: A Necessary Tool 
1. Overview of Eminent Domain 
Governments may acquire property by every method available 
to individuals. In addition, the government has a property acquisi­
tion method that is unavailable to private citizens: eminent domain. 
Eminent domain permits the government to take private property 
from its owner without the owner's consent. The phrase "eminent 
domain" was coined in 1625, but a rudimentary form of this prop­
erty acquisition method was well known in ancient times.29 The Su­
preme Court conceptualized the eminent domain power as an 
implicit, inherent, part of government. 
It requires no constitutional recognition; it is an attribute of sov­
ereignty. The clause found in the Constitutions of the several 
States providing for just compensation for property taken is a 
mere limitation upon the exercise of the right. When the use is 
public, the necessity or expediency of appropriating any particu­
lar property is not a subject of judicial cognizance. The property 
may be appropriated by an act of the legislature, or the power of 
appropriating it may be delegated to private corporations, to be 
exercised by them in the execution of works in which the public is 
interested.3D 
money toward the ultimate creation of a state park at Fort Trumbull." Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). 
29. Matthew P. Harrington, 'Public Use' and the Original Understanding of the 
So-Called 'Takings' Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1249 (2002). 
The exact origins of the power of eminent domain remain something of a 
mystery. Some claim that the earliest exercise of the power to expropriate 
land for public use occurred when Israel's King Ahab took Naboth's vineyard, 
while others argue that the power has been in use "since the days of the Ro­
mans." Regardless of the date of its first use, however, the term, "eminent 
domain," (dominium eminens), appears to have been coined by Hugo Grotius 
in 1625, in his work, De Jure Belli et Pads. According to Grotius, 
the property of subjects belongs to the state under the right of eminent 
domain; in consequence the state, or he who represents the state, can use 
the property of subjects, and even destroy it or alienate it, not only in case 
of direct need, which grants even to private citizens a measure of right 
over others' property, but also for the sake of the public advantage; and 
to the public advantage those very persons who formed the body politic 
should be considered as desiring that private advantage should yield. But, 
we must add, when this happens, the state is bound to make good at pub­
lic expense the damage to those who lose their property. 
Id. at 1249-50 (citations omitted). 
30. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878); see also United States v. Get­
tysburg & Elec. R.R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896) (It is "not necessary that the power 
of condemnation for such purpose be expressly given by the Constitution. The right to 
condemn at all is not so given. It results from the powers that are given, and it is 
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Public projects are planned with significant public input. Local 
officials work to implement those plans by a voluntary sale and typ­
ically only use eminent domain as a tool of last resort. This occurs 
most often when an owner will not sell or insists on receiving more 
than the fair market value for the property31 and: 
The eminent domain power is necessary to cure what is itself a 
political problem-the capacity of individual private property 
holders to frustrate majority will by refusing to sell privately held 
land for public purposes. In theory, publicly interested officials 
will use the condemnation power only to solve what is called the 
"land assembly" problem and only to do so where the result is to 
confer net benefits on their constituents, that is, only to make 
residents as a whole better off, even though some of those re­
sidents will lose private property that they might have preferred 
to retain.32 
The procedural mechanics of eminent domain vary among the 
different governmental entities that have the power to exercise it. 
Ordinarily, the process involves at least three steps: first, the prop­
erty that is taken must be identified, the owners must be notified, 
and a public plan must be prepared;33 second, the acquisition of the 
implied because of its necessity, or because it is appropriate in exercising those pow­
ers."). But cf Harrington, supra note 29, at 1248 ("[T]he so-called 'public use' limita­
tion on takings is a contrivance of relatively recent origin. In using the term 'public use' 
in the Fifth Amendment, the drafters did not intend to impose a substantive limit on 
congressional expropriations. Rather, they intended to distinguish a certain type of tak­
ing which required compensation (expropriations) from those which did not (taxes and 
forfeitures). In essence, the drafters merely intended to ensure that compensation was 
given when a citizen was called upon to contribute more than his fair share to support 
the government. Thus, takings by expropriation required compensation, while takings 
by taxation would not. To reiterate, if read properly, the expropriation clause of the 
Fifth Amendment is nothing more than a compensation clause. Consequently, efforts 
to use the term 'public use' to limit the power of Congress to expropriate land are 
illegitimate and are a misreading of the drafters' intent."). 
31. The "holdout problem," as it is known, seems to occur most often where sev­
eral parcels have to be assembled in order to successfully implement a project. Human 
motivation is a fusion of factors. There can be many reasons a person does not want to 
sell. In the eminent domain context, two reasons seem to predominate. First, a person 
may be emotionally attached to the property for a variety of legitimate reasons, such as 
long-time family ownership of the property. Second, a person may be using the public 
need for the property to extract a higher price than the fair market value for the prop­
erty. It can be difficult to assess the owner's true motivation for refusing to sell. In 
some cases, a genuine emotional attachment to the property may be a guise for leverag­
ing a higher price from the public. In others, a demand of an exorbitant price for prop­
erty can be a garbled expression of deep emotional attachment to the property. See 
also infra note 51. 
32. Gillette, supra note 27, at 14-15. 
33. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 5C (2004). 
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private property must be expressly authorized by a vote of the pub­
lic's governing body;34 and finally, some provision must be made­
generally by a specific appropriation-.to compensate the owner35 
and an appropriate appellate process must be provided.36 To put 
together the land needed to implement the publicly authorized de­
velopment plan and create the conditions needed to restore the 
Fort Trumbull peninsula to economic prosperity, New London had 
to use eminent domain. Of course, the exercise of eminent domain 
to take private property from owners who are unwilling to part with 
it can become controversial and be vigorously opposed. Kelo was 
just such a case. 
2. New London's Use of Eminent Domain 
In Connecticut, a local government's power of eminent do­
main37 can be delegated. This is expressly authorized by state law 
under which the innumerable tasks required to implement an eco­
nomic-development project can be delegated to a private, non­
profit economic-development corporation.38 New London exer­
cised this authority and selected the New London Development 
Corporation (NLDC)39 as its agent to plan, design, and implement 
the economic revitalization. Thereafter, the following significant 
events in the economic revitalization process took place: 
"In April, 1998, the New London city council gave initial ap­
proval to prepare a development plan for the Fort Trumbull area 
and the [development corporation] began holding informal 
neighborhood meetings regarding the [development plan] pro­
cess. In May, 1998, the city council authorized [the development 
corporation] to proceed under chapters 130, 132 and/or 588 (I) of 
the [General] Statutes. 
34. See, e.g, id. § 1. 
35. See, e.g, id. § 6. 
36. See, e.g., id. §§ 14, 18. 
37. See CONN. CaNST. art. I, § 11 ("The property of no person shall be taken for 
public use, without just compensation therefor."). 
38. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-188 (2006) (providing that "[a]ny municipality ... is 
authorized, by vote of its legislative body, to designate ... a nonprofit development 
corporation as its development agency and exercise through such agency the powers 
granted under this chapter"); see also Kelo v. City of New London (Keto 1/), 843 A.2d 
500, 513-15 nn.15-19 (Conn. 2004), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
39. The NLDC is a private, non-profit, Connecticut economic-development cor­
poration. New London Corp. Dev., About Us, http://www.nldc.org/aboutus/nldc_org 
.hlm (last visited Dec. 26, 2006). 
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"The state bond commission approved more funds40 for [the 
development corporation] activity. In June, 1998, the city for­
mally conveyed the New London Mills site to Pfizer. In July, 
1998, a consulting team was appointed for the state Environmen­
tal Protection Act process and to prepare the [development 
plan]. Six alternative plans for the project area were considered 
as part of the required environmental impact evaluation. "41 
The development plan that ultimately emerged from this pro­
cess was approved by the NLDC, the Cii.y of New London, and the 
State of Connecticut.42 The goals of the approved plan were to cre­
ate "a development that would complement the facility that Pfizer 
was planning to build, create jobs, increase tax and other revenues, 
encourage public access to and use of the city's waterfront, and 
eventually 'build momentum' for the revitalization of the rest of the 
city, including its downtown area. "43 
Under the approved plan, the 115 separate parcels and the for­
mer Naval Undersea Warfare Center site44 were all to be acquired 
and consolidated into seven major development parcels,45 each de­
40. The state bond commission had already authorized bonds in January 1998. 
See supra note 28. 
41. Keto II, 843 A.2d at 508-09 (quoting the trial record). 
42. The Connecticut Departments of Economic and Community Development 
and Environmental Protection, the Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, and 
the Southeastern Connecticut Council of Governments also approved the development 
plan. Id. at 510 n.8. 
43. [d. at 509. 
44. Although the NUWC site contained a total of thirty-two acres, eighteen of 
those acres were carved out from the rest and sold to the State of Connecticut to be­
come the site of the Fort Trumbull State Park. Kelo v. City of New London (Keto III), 
125 S. Ct. 2655, 2659 (2005). 
45. "The development plan itself is divided into seven parcels of land." Keto II, 
843 A.2d at 509. 
Parcell will include a waterfront hotel and conference center, along with ma­
rinas for both transient tourist boaters, and commercial fishing vessels. Parcel 
1 also will include a public walkway along the waterfront. Parcel 2 will pro­
vide for approximately eighty new residences, organized into an urban neigh­
borhood and linked by public walkway to the remainder of the development 
plan, including the Fort Trumbull State Park. Space will be reserved at the 
southern end of parcel 2 for the United States Coast Guard Museum (mu­
seum), which will be moved to the development plan area from the nearby 
United States Coast Guard Academy. 
Parcel 3 is projected to have at least 90,000 square feet of high technology 
research and development office space and parking. This office space would 
be located close to other research and development facilities, including those 
of Pfizer. The location of parcel 3 allows for direct vehicular access to the 
development therein, obviating the need for that traffic to pass through the 
rest of the development area. Parcel 3 also will retain the existing Italian Dra­
86 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:75 
signed to maximize the economic potential of its unique design and 
precise geographic location. The seven new development parcels 
would function in a complementary manner to make the sum 
greater than its parts.46 The approved development plan was a pub­
lic one, designed to ensure the long-term prosperity of New 
London. The approved plan would remain in effect for ninety-nine 
years. During that period of time, the NLDC would lease the seven 
newly configured parcels for a nominal rent to a private developer. 
The private developer would invest the majority of private capital 
needed to build and market the structures in accordance with the 
approved development plan. At the end of ninety-nine years, New 
London would resume complete control over the seven fully devel­
oped parcels. New London could then decide what to do with the 
parcels.47 
Though complex, the plan had the potential, if properly imp le­
matic Club, a private social organization with its own building. Four proper­
ties owned by three of the plaintiffs are located on parcel 3. 
Parcel 4 is subdivided into two smaller parcels, 4A and 4B. Parcel 4A is 
designated for "park support"; it will provide parking or retail services for the 
adjacent state park. Parcel 4B will include a marina, which will be a renova­
tion of an existing marina and include slips for both recreational boating and 
commercial fishing operations. The walkway will be continued through these 
parcels. Eleven properties owned by four of the plaintiffs are located on par­
cel4A. 
Parcel 5 also is subdivided into three separate parcels, which cumulatively 
will include 140,000 square feet of office space, parking and retail space. Par­
cel6 will be developed for a variety of water-dependent commercial uses. Par­
cel 7 is small and will be used for additional office or research and 
development use. 
Id. at 509-10 (citations omitted). 
46. The Connecticut Supreme Court declined 

to address the plaintiffs' parcel-specific claims in this context because an ap­

propriate public use analysis necessarily requires evaluation of the develop­

ment plan as a whole-the end result of the sum of all of its parts. [They 

would], however, address the plaintiffs' parcel-specific claims in the related 

context of reasonable necessity; that is, whether the taking of the plaintiffs' 

property was reasonably necessary to achieve the public purpose of the devel­

opment plan. 
Id. at 537 n.50 (citations omitted). 
47. 	 Id. at 510. 
According to Admiral David Goebel, chief operating officer of the 
[NLDC], the [NLDC] will own the land located within the development area. 
The [NLDC] will enter into ground leases of various parcels to private devel­
opers; those leases will require the developer to comply with the terms of the 
development plan. At the time of trial, the [NLDC] was negotiating with Cor­
coran Jennison, a developer, with the intention of entering into a ninety-nine 
year ground lease of parcels 1, 2 and 3 with the developer. Under the lease, 
Corcoran Jennison will pay the [NLDC] rent of $1 per year. Corcoran Jenni­
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mented, to restart the Fort Trumbull economic engine and make 
New London a vibrant urban community once again. A significant 
social cost had to be paid in order to make the most of this golden 
opportunity.48 To implement the carefully designed, government 
approved,49 thoroughly reviewed, and flexible development plan,so 
the NLDC began negotiating a fair price with the owners of the 115 
separate parcels. In this manner, the NLDC acquired 100 of the 
privately owned parcels. The owners of the remaining fifteen par­
cels refused to sell (hereinafter referred to as the "holdout par­
cels").sl When New London attempted to take the holdout parcels 
by eminent domain, the property owners filed suit in the Connecti­
son will actually develop the parcels, a process that includes marketing for and 
loca ting tenants. 
Id. 
48. '''An old New London neighborhood with all of its memories, in effect, has 
been destroyed. People like the plaintiffs have been or might yet be removed from 
homes they love and in some cases from homes where their families have lived for 
generations.'" Id. at 540 n.57 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo I), No. 
557299,2002 WL 500238 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002)). 
49. Id. at 548 n.n (quoting the New London City Council resolution of January 
2000 that, among other things, approved the Fort Trumbull development plan and au­
thorized the NLDC to carry it out by exercising all the legal powers permitted under 
the Connecticut General Statutes "including the power of eminent domain with[in] the 
project area in the name of the City of New London"). 
50. The New London Development Plan calls for the Fort Trumbull Peninsula to 
"be developed as a dynamic mixed-use urban district that fully develops the 
opportunities presented by its waterfront location and its adjacency to the de­
veloping regional assets of the Fort Trumbull State Park and the Pfizer [g]lobal 
[d]evelopment [f]acility. The development of its proposed land uses shall sup­
port the formation of a vibrant Waterfront Urban Village, which binds each of 
its components into a highly cohesive urban district. 
"The integrated nature of the proposed development shall (a) increase 
public access and use of the waterfront, (b) maintain a community atmos­
phere, and (c) enhance the location's attractiveness and desirability. The es­
tablishment of strong functional, spatial and physical interrelationships between 
the district's various buildings, streets, public spaces and the waterfront, shall 
orient the development of each of the proposed land use components. " 
Id. at 574 n.108 (alterations added by the court). 
51. The Connecticut Supreme Court quoted the trial court's memorandum of de­
cision in order to express this point: 
"[E]ach of the plaintiffs testified and said they wished to remain in their 
homes for a variety of personal reasons. Two of the people referred to the fact 
that their families have lived in their homes for decades. They all testified that 
they loved their homes and the Fort Trumbull area. Several have put a lot of 
work into their property and all of them appeared ... to be sincerely attached 
to their homes. One owner, [Susette] Kelo, loved the view her house afforded 
her and the fact that it was close to the water. All testified that they were not 
opposed to new development in the Fort Trumbull area. Also, two of the 
plaintiffs own their property as business investments-the rental of apart­
ments. These two people have put much time, money and effort into renovat­
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cut Superior Court seeking a permanent injunction preventing the 
taking. The Kelo case was underway. 
II. THE LAW IN CONNECTICUT 
A. The State Superior Court Decision 
"After a seven-day bench trial, the [Superior C]ourt granted 
permanent injunctive relief to, and dismissed the pending eminent 
domain actions against, the four plaintiffs who live[d] on parcel 4A 
of the development plan. The court, however, upheld the takings of 
the parcel 3 properties. "52 Both sides appealed the decision. With 
respect to the ultimate federal constitutional issue, the following 
facts53 found by the trial judge are important:54 
The ... development plan, which is a composite of the most 
beneficial features of six alternate development plans ... consid­
ered, would have a significant socioeconomic impact on the New 
London region. The development plan is expected to generate 
approximately between: (1) 518 and 867 construction jobs; (2) 
718 and 1362 direct jobs; and (3) 500 and 940 indirect jobs. The 
composite parcels of the development plan also are expected to 
generate between $680,544 and $1,249,843 in property tax reve­
ing their properties, one has owned his property for seventeen years, the other 
for about eight years." 
Id. at 511 (quoting Kelo I, 2002 WL 500238, at *3). 
52. Id. (citation omitted). 
53. The Connecticut Superior Court decision, written by Judge Corradino, was 
not officially reported; however, it is available through Westlaw. Kelo v. City of New 
London (Kelo I), No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002). The 
Connecticut Supreme Court adopted the "background facts and procedural history ... 
aptly set forth in the trial court's comprehensive memorandum of decision." Kelo II, 
843 A.2d at 508. 
54. The proper role for fact finding in constitutional litigation "remains adrift in 
an epistemological fog." David Faigman, Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases, in How 
LAW KNOWS 156 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2006). In cases such as Kelo, where the appel­
late courts did not hear live testimony or watch the witnesses testify, they will not have 
the same institutional opportunity as the trial court to assess witness credibility, deter­
mine witness veracity, and measure the weight to be given to oral testimony. Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 701 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("An appellate court 
never has the benefit of the [trial] court's intimate familiarity with the details of the 
case-nor the full benefit of its hearing of the live testimony ...."). For these reasons, 
the trial court's findings of fact are characteristically considered conclusive and ordina­
rily will not be disturbed on appeal. In Kelo, the facts found by the trial court were not 
successfully challenged. Consequently, they are the facts of the case for purposes of 
appellate review. This means that when appellate courts review the issues on appeal, 
the only facts they can reliably use to decide the Kelo appeal are those facts found by 
the New London Superior Court trial judge. See id. at 702 (quoting Commissioner v. 
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960». 
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nues for the city, in which 54 percent of the land area is exempt 
from property taxes. These gains would occur in a city that, with 
the exception of the new Pfizer facility adjacent to the develop­
ment plan area that now employs approximately 2000 people, re­
cently has experienced serious employment declines, particularly 
with the loss of approximately 1900 government sector positions, 
and the closure of the United States Naval Undersea Warfare 
Center in 1996, which transferred more than 1000 positions to 
Newport, Rhode Island. Indeed, the state office of policy and 
management has designated the city a "distressed 
m unici pali ty. "55 
These are the key facts in the case upon which the constitutional 
issues revolve. 
B. The State Supreme Court Decision 
Most state constitutions use the same two-word phrase-"pub­
lic use"-in their legal framework governing eminent domain tak­
ings.56 The Connecticut Constitution authorizes eminent domain 
taking in substantially the same words as the "Takings Clause" of 
the Fifth Amendment.57 In deciding the Kelo appeal, the Connecti­
cut Supreme Court engaged in a full and thorough review of the 
55. Kelo ll, 843 A.2d at 510 (citations omitted). 
56. See, e.g., CaNN. CaNST. art. I, § 11 ("The property of no person shall be taken 
for public use, without just compensation therefor."); MASS. CaNST. pt. 1, art. 10 ("[N]o 
part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to 
public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the peo­
ple.... And whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual 
should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation 
therefor."); N.Y. CaNST. art. I, § 7 ("Private property shall not be taken for public use 
without just compensation. "). There are only six states that do not use the phrase "pub­
lic use" in their constitutions, but two of those states do use the phrase "public pur­
pose." FLA. CaNST. art. X, § 6 ("No private property shall be taken except for a public 
purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit 
in the registry of the court and available to the owner."); LA. CaNST. art. 1, § 4(b) 
("Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions except 
for public purposes. "). The constitutions of Georgia and Indiana allow a taking for any 
use. See GA. CaNST. art. IX, § 2, pt. VII ("The General Assembly may authorize any 
county, municipality, or housing authority to undertake and carry out community rede­
velopment, which may include the sale or other disposition of property acquired by 
eminent domain to private enterprise for private uses."); IND. CaNST. art. I, § 21 ("No 
person's property shall be taken by law, without just compensation; nor, except in case 
of the State, without such compensation first assessed and tendered."). Note, however, 
that an amendment to Georgia's constitution has been proposed which incorporates the 
"public use" concept. See 2006 GA. LAWS 1111 ("The power of eminent domain shall 
not be used for redevelopment purposes by any entity, except for public use, as defined 
by general law."). 
57. Compare U.S. CaNST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for 
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applicable Connecticut law on the public-use issue. It then deter­
mined, based upon the facts found by the Superior Court and its 
own analysis of the applicable law, that the eminent domain takings 
of the fifteen holdout parcels were all for a public use and therefore 
lawful.58 
In deciding the appeal from the Connecticut Superior Court in 
Kelo, the Connecticut Supreme Court rendered its final judgment 
upon the law, concluding that "economic development projects cre­
ated and implemented pursuant to chapter 132 that have the public 
economic benefits of creating new jobs, increasing tax and other 
revenues, and contributing to urban revitalization, satisfy the pub­
lic-use clauses of the state and federal constitutions."59 For pur­
poses of the public-use issue, the most significant part of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court's decision is its recognition that Con­
necticut law "authorizes the use of eminent domain for private eco­
nomic development."6o The Connecticut legislature specifically 
found "that the economic welfare of the state depends upon the 
continued growth of industry and business within the state" and 
that acquiring and improving 
"unified land and water areas and vacated commercial plants to 
meet the needs of industry and business should be in accordance 
with local, regional and state planning objectives; that such acqui­
sition and improvement often cannot be accomplished through 
the ordinary operations of private enterprise at competitive rates 
of progress and economies of cost; that permitting and assisting 
municipalities to acquire and improve ... [such areas] are public 
uses and purposes for which public moneys may be expended; 
and that the necessity in the public interest for the provisions of 
this chapter is hereby declared as a matter of legislative 
determination. "61 
The New London City Council authorized the NLDC to ac­
quire all the holdout parcels by eminent domain.62 The entire pro­
cess was authorized and implemented according to Connecticut 
state law. Years before the eminent domain takings in the Kelo 
public use, without just compensation"), with CONN. CaNST. art. I, § 11 ("The property 
of no person shall be taken for public use, without just compensation therefor."). 
58. Keto II, 843 A.2d at 520. 
59. Id. (citations omitted). 
60. Id. at 521. 
61. Id. at 512-13 n.13, 520 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 (2000)) (emphasis 
omitted). 
62. Kelo v. City of New London (Keto III), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2659 (2005). 
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case, the Connecticut legislature determined that this type of revi­
talization activity is in the public's interest.63 The public policy of 
Connecticut authorizes distressed municipalities to take private 
property, by eminent domain, for economic-development purposes 
under an approved plan. Such acquisitions were declared to be a 
public use and a purpose "for which public moneys may be ex­
pended."64 The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld that state legis­
lative determination.65 The executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of the state government agreed: Economic development is 
a valid public use for which private property can be taken under the 
governmental power of eminent domain in Connecticut.66 
In addition to analyzing, discussing, and deciding all the state 
law issues, the Connecticut Supreme Court also opined about the 
federal constitutionality of the Kelo taking.67 On that issue, the 
United States Supreme Court is the final authority.68 The Kelo 
plaintiffs petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, 
and their petition was granted.69 
63. Kelo /1,843 A.2d at 512-13. 
64. [d. at 513. 
65. [d. at 519. 
66. In the Connecticut courts, the Kelo plaintiffs challenged the constitutional va­
lidity of the delegation by New London of its eminent domain power to the NLDC. [d. 
at 547. The Connecticut Supreme Court agreed with the position taken by New 
London and the NLDC that "the delegation in the present case is constitutionally valid 
because the development corporation is the city's statutorily authorized agent for the 
implementation of the development plan, a constitutionally valid public purpose, and is 
not acting to further its own operations." [d. at 547. 
67. See id. at 519, 528. 
68. "This great principle is, that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance 
thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective states, 
and cannot be controlled by them." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
426 (1819). 
69. The Supreme Court is a court that primarily exercises appellate jurisdiction. 
It does not regularly conduct formal fact finding proceedings, but it has the authority to 
do so. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. "Relatively few original jurisdiction cases come to the 
Court. In recent times there have been one or two a year. The Court's practice in these 
cases is to appoint a 'Master' to hear the evidence, determine facts, and recommend a 
decision." Thomas R. Bruce, Original Jurisdiction, Legal Info. Inst., Cornell Law 
School, WEX (2005), http://WWW.law.comell.edu/wex/index.PhP/originaljurisdiction 
(lastvisitedDec.26.2006);SeealsoDAVIDM.O.BRIEN.II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND 
POLITICS 100 (4th ed. 2000) ("The Supreme Court is the only federal court in the 
United States to have complete power to decide what to decide, that is, which cases to 
hear. This power enables the Court to set its own agenda as welI as to manage its 
docket. Like other courts, the Supreme Court, however, must await issues brought by 
lawsuits; it does not initiate its own. Also, like other social institutions, it is affected by 
social change .... The Court now functions like a roving commission in responding to 
social forces. "). 
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III. THE CORE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE 
A. Application of the Fifth Amendment to the States 
The nucleus of the federal constitutional controversy in Kelo70 
is the phrase "public use" in the Fifth Amendment. These words 
have been a part of the Federal Constitution since the Bill of Rights 
was adopted in 1791, but for decades, it only applied to the federal 
government, not to state and local governments.71 The Founding 
Fathers clearly understood that the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment did not apply to any eminent domain taking made by 
any state or local government. Chief Justice Marshall explained the 
reasons for this, stating: 
The constitution was ordained and established by the people 
of the United States for themselves, for their own government, 
and not for the government of the individual states. Each state 
established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, pro­
vided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its partic­
ular government as its judgment dictated. The people of the 
United States framed such a government for the United States as 
they supposed best adapted to their situation, and best calculated 
to promote their interests. The powers they conferred on this 
government were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on 
power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, we think, 
necessarily applicable to the government created by the instru­
ment. They are limitations of power granted in the instrument 
itself; not of distinct governments, framed by different persons 
and for different purposes. 
If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must 
be understood as restraining the power of the general govern­
ment, not as applicable to the states. In their several constitu­
tions they have imposed such restrictions on their respective 
governments as their own wisdom suggested; such as they 
deemed most proper for themselves. It is a subject on which they 
judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no farther than 
they are supposed to have a common interest.72 
70. Misinformation about the Kelo decision was widely disseminated after the 
Supreme Court issued its decision. It aroused an "unjustified fear that all homes may 
be now suddenly at risk of seizure by Big Brother." John McIlwain, A Primer on Kelo 
v. New London; Eminent Domain on a Slippery Slope (Aug. 26, 2005), URB. LAND 
INST., http://www . uli.org/ AM/Template.cfm ?Section=search& template=/CM/HTML 
Display.cfm&ContentID=33971. 
71. Kelo /I, 843 A.2d at 519, 519 n.27; see Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 
(1 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
72. Barron, 32 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 247-48. 
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When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, its 
Due Process Clause was binding upon the states.73 Thereafter, the 
Supreme Court began incorporating select provisions of the Bill of 
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirement: 
Although some members of the Supreme Court have 
deemed the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the Bill of 
Rights (actually, the first eight amendments) in its totality, a ma­
jority of the Supreme Court has never adopted this view and has, 
in fact, specifically rejected it, stating that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not a shorthand incorporation of the first eight 
amendments.74 
The "incorporation" process has proceeded on a case-by-case 
basis. It was not until the latter part of the nineteenth century that 
the Court incorporated the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause into 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, thereby making 
it applicable to state and local governmental takings of private 
property.75 Thus, any original intent76 investigation into the mean­
ing of the Takings Clause necessarily 
requires a full analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment, how it was 
framed, the meaning of its phraseology, and its parlous course in 
the legislatures and the courts from 1868 to our own day. Analy­
sis must consider also the renewed fusion of Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence and federal review with eminent domain and tak­
ings questions in the states. Attention to this interesting history 
will, if nothing else, serve as a salutary reminder of how constitu­
73. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
§l. 
74. 16 AM. lUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 404 (1998) (citations omitted). 
75. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) 
(citations omitted). 
76. Those who oppose the concept of "incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the 
Fourteenth Amendment" should remember 
that the first of the Bill of Rights limitations to be swept in and applied to the 
states through incorporation by the Supreme Court, nearly a century ago, was 
not a search and seizure, church-state, free speech, or right to counselor some 
other criminal matter but a good sound property question: none other than the 
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Harry N. Scheiber, The "Takings" Clause and the Fifth Amendment: Original Intent and 
Significance in American Legal Development, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL 
MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 233, 243 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed. 1991) 
(citation omitted). 
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tional change has its ironies and its challenges to lawyers who pay 
lip service, at least, to consistency of doctrine.77 
Two years before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court began taking "a flexible approach" 
to construing the public-use clause in the Connecticut Constitu­
tion.78 After 1897, all eminent domain takings had to meet the min­
imum requirements expressed in the Fifth Amendment's Takings 
Clause to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment due process.79 Thus, a 
federalism issue arose in Kelo. What, if any, constitutional weight 
should be afforded to the laws and decisions which were in effect or 
decided prior to the time the Fifth Amendment became applicable 
to the states? 
New London's taking of the Fort Trumbull property was cho­
sen for review by the Supreme Court so the Court could decide 
whether economic development is a public use for which private 
property may be taken under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. The Supreme Court faced a difficult question: should 
the Court ignore the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision on that 
same issue. The issue is significant because the phrase "public use" 
is found in both the United States and Connecticut constitutions. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court based its decision upon a state 
precedent adopted in 1866, a time when the Fifth Amendment Tak­
ings Clause was inapplicable to state eminent domain proceedings. 
The Connecticut decision was founded upon a modern declaration 
of public policy by the Connecticut legislature and consistent with 
Supreme Court precedents.8o 
77. Id. 
78. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo II), 843 A.2d 500, 522 (Conn. 2004) (citing 
Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (1866), which established "the foundation for our 
deferential approach to legislative declarations of public use"). Olmstead v. Camp also 
answered the question, '''what [ ] is the limit of the legislative power under the clause 
which we have been considering, and what is the exact line between public and private 
uses?'" by stating that" 'there can be no precise line. The power requires a degree of 
elasticity to be capable ofmeeting new conditions and improvements and the ever increas­
ing necessities ofsociety. The sole dependence must be on the presumed wisdom of the 
sovereign authority, supervised, and in cases of gross error or extreme wrong, con­
trolled, by the dispassionate judgment of the courts.'" Id. at 523 (quoting Olmstead v. 
Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 551 (1866)) (emphasis by the court). 
79. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. 226. 
80. See, e.g., Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain's Po­
litical Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 282 (2006) ("[P]prior to 
Kelo's arrival, the narrow interpretation [that had been applied to the public use defini­
tion in the nineteenth century] vanished and the definition of public use had again in­
flated to include incidental public benefits that appear rather remote from 
unquestionably public-minded undertakings such as schools or public roads. Similarly, 
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B. The Ambiguous Takings Clause 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states "nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensa­
tion."81 The clause "has been interpreted to mean that the govern­
ment can take private property only for a public use and if it pays 
the owners just compensation. "82 Construing the Takings Clause in 
this way83 provides some measure of constitutional protection 
against arbitrary government property seizures: 
These two limitations serve to protect "the security of Prop­
erty," which Alexander Hamilton described to the Philadelphia 
Convention as one of the "great obj[ects] of Gov[ernment]." To­
gether they ensure stable property ownership by providing safe­
guards against excessive, unpredictable, or unfair use of the 
government's eminent domain power-particularly against those 
owners who, for whatever reasons, may be unable to protect 
themselves in the political process against the majority's wil1.84 
It gives constitutional protection to an idea that has been said 
to be "founded in natural equity" and recognized as a "principle of 
universal law."85 Construing the Takings Clause in this sensible 
manner, however, does not free the clause of ambiguity. The Kelo 
the deference afforded legislative determinations of public use has increased over 
time."). 
81. 	 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
82. Thomas W. Merrill, The Goods, the Bads, and the Ugly, LEGAL AFF., Jan.! 
Feb. 2005, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2005/toa_ 
merrill..Janfeb05.msp; see also Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo Ill), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 
2672 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have read the Fifth Amendment's lan­
guage to impose two distinct conditions on the exercise of eminent domain: the taking 
must be for a 'public use' and 'just compensation' must be paid to the owner." (citation 
and internal quotations omitted». 
83. 	 There are other possible interpretations of the takings clause. 
The phrase "for public use" qualifies the word "taken," but only as a de­
scriptive qualifier-it is not, at least not on the face of it, a limitation, self­
enforcing or otherwise. Earlier colonial charters of liberties had used the 
phrase "pressed or taken for any public use or service," and the like; it was 
tautological, as it were, that if government took property it was for public 
use.... [I]n the hands of nineteenth-century judges the concept of "public 
use" quickly became a limitation-for these judges interpreted it as a limiting 
concept derived from natural and civil law. 
Scheiber, supra note 76, at 235 (citation omitted); see also Harrington, supra note 29, at 
1249 ("[T]he term 'public use' as used in the Fifth Amendment was meant to be de­
scriptive, rather than proscriptive, and [] the term was not intended to operate as a 
substantive limitation on Congress' power to expropriate property."). 
84. Kelo Ill, 125 S. Ct. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
85. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897). 
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case concerns a controversy over the "public use" phrase in the 
Takings Clause. 
The Constitution is not a dictionary. It does not define "public 
use." What that phrase means depends upon who defines it.86 The 
Constitution is not a word game ruled by "some sort of nine-headed 
Caesar, giving thumbs-up or thumbs-down to whatever outcome, 
case by case, suits or offends its collective fancy."87 As Justice Ste­
vens, writing for the majority in Kelo, pointed out, 
"[the] Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that con­
demned property be put into use for the general public." Indeed, 
while many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed "use by 
the public" as the proper definition of public use, that narrow 
view steadily eroded over time. Not only was the "use by the 
public" test difficult to administer (e.g., what proportion of the 
public need have access to the property? at what price?), but it 
proved to be impractical given the diverse and always evolving 
needs of society. Accordingly, when this Court began applying 
the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th cen­
tury, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of 
public use as "public purpose."88 
The key aspect of the Court's opinion in Kelo was its decision 
about who should define the phrase "public use" for purposes of 
the economic-development project in New London. The issue is 
constitutionally significant because of the separation of powers. 
86. There has been a lot of discussion regarding the proper definition of "public 
use" under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. When courts define the phrase 
they tend to define it broadly or narrowly depending upon the views of the judge mak­
ing the decision. Whether actual public use is required or whether a public benefit is 
sufficient are just two of the many issues that arise from following this approach to the 
public use issue. "Interpreting the Constitution ... presupposes a judicial and political 
philosophy and poses inescapable questions of substantive value choices." O'BRIEN, 
supra note 69, at 87, 94. Applying great deference to resolve the public-use issue en­
ables the Court to avoid becoming enmeshed in this philosophical and linguistic wres­
tling match. 
87. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 454 (2000) (Scalia, I., dissenting). 
88. Keto Ill, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 (citations omitted); cf id. at 2679 (Thomas, I., 
dissenting) ("The most natural reading of the Clause is that it allows the government to 
take property only if the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the 
property, as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or necessity whatsoever. At 
the time of the founding, dictionaries primarily defined the noun 'use' as '[t]he act of 
employing any thing to any purpose.' The term 'use,' moreover, 'is from the Latin utar, 
which means 'to use, make use of, avail one's self of, employ, apply, enjoy, etc.' ... The 
term 'public use,' then, means that either the government or its citizens as a whole must 
actually 'employ' the taken property. Granted, another sense of the word 'use' was 
broader in meaning, extending to '[c]onvenience' or 'help,' or '[qjualities that make a 
thing proper for any purpose.'" (citations omitted». 
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The crux of the constitutional controversy in Kelo was as much po­
litical as it was legal: 
Constitutional interpretation and law, Justice Felix Frankfurter 
observed, "is not at all a science, but applied politics." The Con­
stitution, of course, is a political document and as a written docu­
ment is not self-interpreting; its interpretation is political. How 
the Constitution should be interpreted is thus as controversial as 
the ongoing debate over who should interpret it.89 
The resolution of the political conflict is for the legislature not 
the courts. The judiciary should limit its involvement in the conflict 
to measuring whether the legislature's political decision is inher­
ently incompatible with the basic "public use" in the Fifth Amend­
ment. The wisdom of the legislative decision on that political 
question can be judged by the People when they vote. This is the 
design of our Constitution. 
C. 	 The Roles of the Legislature and the Judiciary in Eminent 
Domain Law 
The American people have an abiding allegiance to the United 
States Constitution. To minimize the potential for governmental 
tyranny, the Constitution aims to separate all government power 
into three co-equal branches.90 The legislative branch makes the 
89. 	 O'BRIEN, supra note 69, at 69 (citation omitted). 
90. Steve Mount, Constitutional Topic: Separation of Powers, http://www.usconsti­
tution.net/consttop_sepp.html (last visited on Dec. 26, 2006). 
The Separation of Powers devised by the framers of the Constitution was 
designed to do one primary thing: to prevent the majority from ruling with an 
iron fist. Based on their experience, the framers shied away from giving any 
branch of the new government too much power. The separation of powers 
provides a system of shared power known as Checks and Balances. 
Three branches are created in the Constitution. The Legislative, com­
posed of the House and Senate, is set up in Article 1. The Executive, com­
posed of the President, Vice-President, and the Departments, is set up in 
Article 2. The Judicial, composed of the federal courts and the Supreme 
Court, is set up in Article 3. 
Each of these branches has certain powers, and each of these powers is 
limited, or checked, by another branch. 
All of these checks and balances, however, are inefficient. But that's by 
design rather than by accident. By forcing the various branches to be account­
able to the others, no one branch can usurp enough power to become 
dominant. 
Id.; see also James Kent, Introductory Law School Lecture in 1794, reprinted in 
O'BRIEN, supra note 69, at 39, 41 (citation omitted) (observing at that early date that 
"[i]t is regarded also as an undisputed principle in American Politics, that the different 
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laws. The executive branch executes the laws. The courts of the 
judicial branch resolve disputes about the interpretation of laws. 
The public-use question is a constitutional crossroad where legisla­
tive power and judicial power intersect. Should the courts or the 
legislature determine which public uses are important enough to al­
low the government to take private property by eminent domain?91 
Both branches have a legitimate role to play in deciding the issue. 
The legislature expresses society's concerns about the commu­
nity. Legislators represent their constituents by initiating, consider­
ing, and enacting laws. This process takes place in public meetings 
and hearings during which information is obtained from several 
sources. Public policy questions are discussed, debated, and voted 
on by the legislature. They are regularly reported in the media. 
The legislative process is well suited for determining how society 
should address its most pressing and important problems. The leg­
islature makes laws and appropriates public funds to solve those 
problems. 
With respect to eminent domain takings, the Constitution re­
quires the government to pay just compensation. That payment is 
made with public funds that the legislature appropriates. The legis­
lature should decide which public uses of private property justify a 
taking by eminent domain. Arguably, this is what the Framers orig­
inally intended.92 When a law is not constitutionally prohibited and 
is designed to achieve any of the goals within the purview of the 
government, the courts should not "inquire into the degree of its 
necessity" because doing so crosses the constitutional line drawn to 
separate the judicial branch from the legislative branch.93 
departments of Government should be kept as far as possible separate and distinct" and 
pointing out that changing "this natural distribution of power" would tend "to overturn 
the balance of the Government, and to introduce Tyranny into the Administration"). 
91. While courts have the power to review decisions of the legislature, they may 
properly decline to do so for several reasons. For example, 
Even when the Court has jurisdiction over a properly framed suit, it may 
decline to rule because it decides that a case raises a "political question" that 
should be resolved by other political branches. Like other jurisdictional doc­
trines, the political question doctrine means what the justices say it means. 
. . . . Litigation that reaches the Court is political, and the justices for 
political reasons decide what and how to decide cases on their docket. 
O'BRIEN, supra note 69, at 118-19. 
92. "[I]f read properly, the expropriation clause of the Fifth Amendment is noth­
ing more than a compensation clause. Consequently, efforts to use the term 'public use' 
to limit the power of Congress to expropriate land are illegitimate and are a misreading 
of the drafters' intent." Harrington, supra note 29, at 1248. 
93. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). 
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The Supreme Court is generally recognized as the final author­
ity on what the Constitution means.94 As the governmental body 
that applies the rule of law to particular cases, it must, therefore, 
"expound and interpret that rule."95 The public-use issue in Kelo 
can be seen in this context-a dispute between an individual's right 
to private property96 and the public's need for economic prosperity. 
The judicial decision in Kelo was a difficult one for the trial judge 
because: 
Really what is involved is conflicting dreams. The plaintiffs wish 
to live out the typical American dream of abiding and owning in 
peace homes and property that they have chosen. Any threat to 
that dream is understandably forcefully and emotionally opposed 
as it should be in a free society. In fact, they are to be respected 
because whether their position is agreed with or not their very 
struggle reinforced shared values in our society. 
On the other side of this controversy are what may be con­
sidered abstract entities-the City of New London, the New 
London Redevelopment Agency. But the people behind these 
abstractions have a dream also. The accomplishment of their 
dream presents no opportunity of personal gain or favor. Their 
dream is for their city buffeted for decades by hard times and 
until recently declining prospects. They hope by this develop­
ment project and resistance to the plaintiffs' litigation to provide 
an economic and social uplift for their city-jobs that will pro­
vide the underemployed or unemployed new hope, new tax mon­
ies so the tax burden on the community can be lifted and new 
94. There are some members of the legal community who challenge "the histori­
cal pedigree of the doctrine of judicial supremacy" and "advocate the rival-and until 
recently almost forgotten-doctrine of 'popular constitutionalism.' This is the idea that 
the highest authority for interpreting the Constitution is not the Supreme Court, but the 
American people." Richard A. Posner, The People's Court, reviewing Larry D. 
Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, in THE 
NEW REPUBLIC, July 19, 2004. 
95. 	 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
96. 	 W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 532 (1848). 
Under every established government, the tenure of property is derived 
mediately or immediately from the sovereign power of the political body, or­
ganized in such mode or exerted in such way as the community or state may 
have thought proper to ordain. It can rest on no other foundation, can have 
no other guarantee. It is owing to these characteristics only, in the original 
nature of tenure, that appeals can be made to the laws either for the protec­
tion or assertion of the rights of property. Upon any other hypothesis, the law 
of property would be simply the law of force. 
[d. 
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programs and projects for the city that can be realized.97 
The judiciary has the constitutional responsibility for resolving 
such conflicts.98 When attempting to find the just balance between 
these conflicting goals, the judiciary "must never forget, that it is a 
constitution [it is] expounding,"99 one which was "intended to en­
dure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the vari­
ous crises of human affairs. "100 In more recent times, the Court has 
observed: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the 
components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might 
have been more specific. They did not presume to have this in­
sight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later 
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper 
in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, per­
sons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own 
search for greater freedom.lOi 
Resolving constitutional conflicts over the public-use issue in 
eminent domain is best done when the resolution preserves and re­
spects the separation of power between the legislative and judicial 
branches of government and, at the same time, ensures that every 
individual gets all the rights constitutionally due him. The individ­
ual's constitutionally protected right to due process of law in an em­
inent domain proceeding is two-fold: the property must be taken 
for a valid public use; and if it is, then just compensation must be 
paid to the owner.1°2 The just-compensation issue was not ad­
dressed in Kelo and it will not be discussed here. The Kelo plain­
tiffs sought to have the takings invalidated and argued, "that the 
97. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo I), No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *3 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002). 
98. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 ("It is emphatically the province ... of the 
judicial department to say what the law is."); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 
486, 549 (1969) ("Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion 
interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the docu­
ment by another branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause can­
not justify the courts' avoiding their constitutional responsibility.") (citations omitted). 
99. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis 
provided). 
100. Id. at 415 (emphasis added). 
101. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). 
102. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231 (2003). But see Scheiber, 
supra note 76, at 235 (The "phrase 'for public use' qualifies the word 'taken,' but only 
as a descriptive qualifier-it is not, at least on the face of it, a limitation, self-enforcing 
or otherwise."). 
2006] WHERE TO GO AFTER KELO? BACK TO THE FUTURE! 101 
issue of fair compensation does not even arise."103 They wanted to 
keep their property "since no amount of compensation can be a 
constitutional substitute for the right of the citizen to remain in his 
or her home or business free of governmental trespass on that 
right."l04 Consequently, the key constitutional question in Kelo in­
volved the public-use issue. The issue was resolved by the deferen­
tial judicial review of public-use determinations. 
D. The Importance of Deferential Judicial Review 
The great accommodation is made by the judicial branch en­
gaging in a deferential review of the public-use issue. The doctrine 
of judicial review J05 makes the judiciary the final authority on legal 
disputes among governmental departments. The courts have de­
vised a range of analytical techniques to help decide the legality of 
disputed government actions. The key characteristic of the judicial 
review standards is that they are generally outcome determinative. 
They range from deferential to activist and have been differentiated 
as follows: 
Deferential standards of judicial review are characterized by 
a judicial tendency toward accepting the determination of the 
governmental entity whose conduct is being examined. Govern­
mental conduct will be upheld if it is in pursuit of "legitimate" 
governmental objectives and the government has used means to 
103. Kelo 1,2002 WL 500238, at *l. 
104. Id. at *26. 
105. Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States 
in the Supreme Court. The Constitution does not specify how the Court should exer­
cise its power. The Supreme Court resolved that issue by deciding the Constitution was 
the fundamental law and took upon itself the power "to say what the law is." Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803). 
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future govern­
ment, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own 
happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has been 
erected.... 
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate 
them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and conse­
quently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legis­
lature, repugnant to the constitution, is void. 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity 
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the 
courts must decide on the operation of each. 
/d. The power to review the actions of the other branches of the government is known 
as the doctrine of judicial review. 
102 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:75 
achieve the objectives that are "rational," in that they are reason­
ably likely to achieve the ends .... 
Activist standards of judicial review, in contrast, are charac­
terized by a judicial tendency to second-guess the governmental 
entity involved, and to uphold the government action only if the 
government is able to demonstrate it is advancing what are 
termed "important" or "compelling" governmental objectives . 
. . . Under activist judicial review, the burden of proof is on 
the government to demonstrate a compelling state interest and 
that the means used are necessary to achieve that interest. More­
over, the government also must demonstrate that there are no 
other alternative means that are less restrictive of the right
106 
Deferential judicial review of the public-use issue is important. 
It allows legislative input into the issue of "who decides," thereby 
respecting the separation of powers principle while preserving judi­
cial authority over constitutional issues.107 After all, there is "much 
to be gained by reaffirming for the people the wonderful reality 
that they govern themselves."108 In deciding the public-use ques­
tion for constitutional purposes, "the Court has made clear that it 
will not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to 
106. John Martinez, Rational Legislating, 34 STETSON L. REv. 547, 560-61 (2005) 
(citations omitted). 
107. The power of eminent domain has its origins 
in the long struggle for legislative supremacy which marked the history of rela­
tions between Crown and Parliament, and which culminated in the American 
Revolution. From a very early date, English law prevented the Crown from 
divesting a subject of title to property, even when necessary for a public use. 
Parliament alone had the power to expropriate land, and it did so exercising its 
right to consent on behalf of the estates of the realm. American political theo­
rists drew on this legal heritage. In the colonial and revolutionary periods, 
Americans repeatedly declared that the power to expropriate private property 
for a public purpose rested in the legislature alone. More importantly, Ameri­
can legislatures repeatedly used their power of expropriation to effect all man­
ner of social and economic engineering, frequently transferring property from 
one private entity to another where it was thought that the transfer would 
effect some greater economic purpose. Having vested their assemblies with 
the power to expropriate property for public use, therefore, American politi­
cal and legal theory left little room for supervision by the judicial branch. For, 
to challenge the means by which legislative consent was given is to challenge 
the representative nature of the legislature itself. 
Harrington, supra note 29, at 1247. 
108. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 464-65 (2000) (Scalia, J., dis­
senting). 
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what constitutes a public use 'unless the use be palpably without 
reasonable foundation.' "109 
Essentially, there are two very practical reasons for applying 
deferential judicial review to questions of public use. First, the con­
cept of "public use" is a slippery one that constantly changes. Pub­
lic use varies over time as the needs of society evolve. The 
vaporous nature of the public-use concept was classically described 
by Justice Douglas: 
An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, 
for each case must turn on its own facts. The definition is essen­
tially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the 
purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor histori­
cally capable of complete definition. Subject to specific constitu­
tional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public 
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such 
cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the 
public needs to be served by social legislation .... This principle 
admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent do­
main is involved. The role of the judiciary in determining 
whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is an 
extremely narrow one.110 
The second practical reason for applying deferential review to 
questions of public use is that while courts are good at applying 
principles of law, when "the principle is one of political will" courts 
do better when they defer 
to the political institutions that can best gauge the political senti­
ment of the time .... 
. . . . [This is not to say] that the political process will inevita­
bly work itself pure, that local officials will never fail to favor 
politically powerful developers over individual residents, even 
when they collectively lobby for their position, especially when 
those residents are likely-post-taking-to move to other juris­
dictions and thus be less able to exact electoral redress from 
those same local officials. Indeed, even comprehensive plans ... 
can be designed and implemented in a manner that is ridden with 
abuse. My claim is only that the capacity of the judiciary to make 
inquiries into the process, to reverse engineer the political deci­
sion to determine whether it was tainted or whether the same 
109. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (quoting United 
States v. Gettysburg Elee. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)). 
110. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (citations omitted) (upholding a 
redevelopment plan targeting a blighted area of Washington, D.C.). 
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decision would have been reached on objective grounds, is mini­
mal. Thus, perhaps the best that a court can do is to define the 
conditions under which the probability of abuse is minimal and 
defer to the political process when those criteria are satisfied. III 
Once the great accommodation (in the form of judicial defer­
ence) is made, all doubts about the correctness of the Kelo decision 
disappear because the key facts of the Kelo case support the deci­
sion made by the city council and other legislative bodies to utilize 
the Connecticut eminent domain statute with respect to the Fort 
Trumbull project. 
E. In Kelo, the Facts and the Law Overcome the Myths 
The majority's decision in Kelo was correct for three reasons. 
First, there were the facts found by the Superior Court trial 
judge. ll2 The trial judge found that the development plan under 
which the challenged takings were made would significantly impact 
the socio-economic conditions in the New London region. The 
judge also found that the revitalization efforts would generate jobs 
and vital tax revenue for New London, where more than half the 
area remains exempt from property tax,113 Moreover, all these 
gains would take place in a distressed city that has experienced seri­
ous employment declines. 
Much of the consternation about the Kelo case consists of con­
jecture.114 Why should the "specter of condemnation"115 speak 
louder in court than the reality on the ground?116 The City of New 
111. Gillette, supra note 27, at 19-20 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
112. Kelo v. City of New London (Keto 1/), 843 A.2d 500, 508-11 (Conn. 2004) 
(citations omitted), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
113. Id. at 510 (approximating between "518 and 867 construction jobs," "718 and 
1362 direct jobs," and "500-940 indirect jobs"); see also Opposition Brief to Petition for 
Certiorari, at *6, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 
WL 1877787. 
114. Some misinformation about Pfizer's supposed involvement in the Keto tak­
ings and the exceptional treatment of the Italian Dramatic Club led to popular specula­
tion regarding the public-use issue; however, those factual theories were soundly 
rejected by the courts. "The trial judge and all the members of the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut agreed that there was no evidence of an illegitimate purpose in this case. 
Therefore ... the City'S development plan was not adopted 'to benefit a particular class 
of identifiable individuals.'" Kelo v. City of New London (Keto 1/1), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 
2661-62 (2005) (citation omitted). 
115. "The specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to pre­
vent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shop­
ping mall, or any farm with a factory." Id. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
116. In fact, the Connecticut Supreme Court emphasized that its decision was 
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London did not use its power of eminent domain to replace a Motel 
6 with a Ritz-Carlton.l17 "While such an unusual exercise of gov­
ernment power would certainly raise a suspicion that a private pur­
pose was afoot, the hypothetical cases posited by petitioners can be 
confronted if and when they arise. They do not warrant the crafting 
of an artificial restriction on the concept of public use."118 
The phrase "public use" in the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment was not meant to be limited to "the exigencies of a few 
years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of 
which were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence."119 
No human can foresee what changes the future will bring. The 
Framers wisely recognized this fact of nature. They understood the 
danger of imposing "restrictions and specifications, which, at the 
present, might seem salutary"120 upon constitutional provisions like 
the phrase "public use." Such unnecessary legalisms "might, in the 
end, prove the overthrow of the system itself. "121 Instead, the 
Framers used general terms like "public use" and left it "to the leg­
islature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to effectuate 
legitimate objects, and to mould and model the exercise of its pow­
ers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests, should require."122 
The New London plan called for replacing massive unemployment 
with jobs, economic decay with economic prosperity, and pollution 
with cleanliness. Implementation of the New London economic-de­
velopment plan replaced conditions causing the financial collapse of 
the Fort Trumbull peninsula with conditions stabilizing New 
London's economy and creating hope for its future prosperity. 
Second, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that under 
"not a license for the unchecked use of the eminent domain power as a tax revenue 
raising measure; rather, our holding is that rationally considered municipal economic 
development projects such as the development plan in the present case pass constitu­
tional muster." Kelo II, 843 A.2d at 543. 
117. See Kelo Ill, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
118. Id. at 2667 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). "Appellate opinions are 
only as robust as the facts on which they are based. When those facts evaporate, the 
opinion on which they rest is weakened as well." Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into 
the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. 
REV. 269, 272 (1999). 




122. [d. at 326-27; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (stat­
ing that the Constitution by its very nature "requires that only its great outlines should 
be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose 
those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves"). 
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state law,123 economic-development projects that benefit the public 
by "creating new jobs, increasing tax and other revenues, and con­
tributing to urban revitalization" will "satisfy the public use clauses 
of the federal and state constitutions."124 Although the Supreme 
Court may question the Connecticut court's federal constitutional 
conclusion,125 the state constitutional conclusion should not be 
questioned.126 Moreover, in making its own decision on the public­
use question, some deference should be given to the decision made 
by the Connecticut Supreme Court: 
The propriety of keeping in view by this court, while enforcing 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the diversity of local conditions and 
of regarding with great respect the judgments of the state courts 
upon what should be deemed public uses in that State, is ex­
pressed, justified, and acted upon .... No case is recalled where 
this court has condemned as a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment a taking upheld by the state court as a taking for 
public uses in conformity with its laws. . . . The cases ... show 
how greatly we have deferred to the opinions of the state courts 
123. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 (2006). 
124. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo II), 843 A.2d 500, 555-56 (Conn. 2004) 
(citations omitted), affd, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
125. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) ("The question, whether 
a law be void for its repugnancy to the constitution, is, at all times, a question of much 
delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative, in a doubtful 
case. The court, when impelled by duty to render such a judgment, would be unworthy 
of its station, could it be unmindful of the solemn obligations which that station im­
poses. But it is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature is to 
be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts to be considered as void. 
The opposition between the constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels 
a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other. "); see also Martin 
v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,346-47 (1816) ("[A]dmitting that the judges 
of the state courts are, and always will be, of as much learning, integrity, and wisdom, as 
those of the courts of the United States ... does not aid the argument. ... The constitu­
tion has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that state attach­
ments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might some times obstruct 
or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of 
justice."). 
126. Even apart from the interests of federalism, practicality suggests state judges 
should be the ones to decide state constitutional law. A state's constitution is the legal 
foundation for the organization of the state. It establishes and controls the state gov­
ernment. To fully appreciate its provisions, it is necessary to be acquainted with the 
history, law, and government of the state which preceded it as well as the philosophical 
concepts upon which it is based. A state supreme court is much better suited to that 
purpose than the United States Supreme Court. It is probable that the state supreme 
court judges will have some experience in the state's legal system; however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court may not. 
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on this subject, which so closely concerns the welfare of their 
people.127 
Third, the Connecticut legislature permitted public monies to 
be spent to help Connecticut's distressed cities acquire property in 
an approved project area and made such transactions a public 
use.128 The fact that these findings were made by the Connecticut 
legislature, instead of Congress, 
does not mean that judicial deference is less appropriate. Judicial 
deference is required because, in our system of government, leg­
islatures are better able to assess what public purposes should be 
advanced by an exercise of the taking power. State legislatures 
are as capable as Congress of making such determinations within 
their respective spheres of authority. Thus, if a legislature, state 
or federal, determines that there are substantial reasons for an 
exercise of the taking power, courts must defer to its determina­
tion that the taking will serve a public use.129 
The public-use issue in Kelo was answered by the Connecticut 
legislature and the Connecticut judiciary. The taking of private 
property by eminent domain in furtherance of a carefully planned, 
publicly approved, economic-development plan that will create 
prosperity in an economically distressed community is a public use 
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. There is noth­
ing inherently incompatible in these local Connecticut policy deci­
sions with the "public use" phrase in the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. Economic development of impoverished areas 10 
America is not inconsistent with anything in the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Revitalizing financially distressed American commumtles by 
encouraging economic development is a constitutionally permissi­
ble public use of the government's eminent domain power. Unem­
ployment leads to poverty and drains the life out of a community. 
Prosperous communities are the cornerstone upon which the stabil­
ity of society is based. As Aristotle wrote, "poverty is the parent of 
revolution and crime."130 The United States recognizes that "the 
Nation's cities, towns, and smaller urban communities face critical 
127. Hairston v. Danville & w. Ry. Co., 208 u.s. 598, 607 (1908) (citations 
omitted). 
128. Keto II, 843 A.2d at 512-13 n.13 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 (2006». 
129. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (citations omitted). 
130. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 2.6.1265b12. 
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social, economic, and environmental problems"131 and "the future 
welfare of the Nation and the well-being of its citizens depend on 
the establishment and maintenance of viable urban communities as 
social, economic, and political entities."132 In too many parts of our 
nation, there is polluted air, land, and water. People are impover­
ished, unhealthy, uneducated, hungry, and homeless. Businesses 
are failing. The public infrastructure is falling apart, and historical 
treasures are neglected. These problems are private, personal trag­
edies as well as societal failures. Solutions are neither cheap nor 
easy. If they were, the problems would have been solved long ago. 
Kelo shows that a public-private partnership can be a catalyst for 
creating a viable foundation for a realistic long-term solution to lo­
cal economic decay. Such a solution must be found to mitigate the 
severity of, if not totally eradicate, the personal tragedies and sys­
temic societal failures which poverty exacerbates. 
Eminent domain is a governmental tool that can produce good 
and bad results depending on how it is used. The Kelo case shows 
that when economic development is expertly implemented through 
a carefully planned and cooperative partnership between the public 
and private sectors, the public gains. The Fort Trumbull area has 
been revitalized into an area that attracts people. In fact, the Fort 
Trumbull State Park now offers amenities such as walking paths, a 
fishing pier, and a visitors' center.133 New London is a place where 
new jobs paying decent wages have replaced massive unemploy­
ment and poverty has given way to prosperity. Every economically 
distressed city, impoverished rural area, and underemployed and 
unemployed American should be so fortunate. 
131. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. 
I, § 101, 88 Stat. 633, 633 (codified as amended at 42 u.s.c. § 5301 (a) (2000)). 
132. Id. at 633-34 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 5301(b)). 
133. Conn. Dep't of Env't Prot., Fort Trumbull State Park, http://www.dep.state.ct 
.us/stateparks/parks/fort_trumbull.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2006); see also Iver Peter­
son, As Land Goes to Revitalization, There Go the Old Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 
2005, § 1, at 29, available at 2005 WLNR 1273623 (Westlaw) (noting that not only have 
the local and state governments built the public park, the asbestos at the former Naval 
Undersea Warfare Center site has been removed). 
